



I BELIEVE that we are still in an era of theorizing which may be called post­modern. A view of the relation between the world’s religions that seems 
quite consistent with the love of diversity and suspicion of grand theories 
which characterizes post-modernism has been expounded by Abe Masao. 
Professor Abe’s position is that there is no common denominator to the 
world’s religions. In particular, he dismisses unifying principles such as 
“God or Reality” and “faith,” proposed by John Hick and Wilfred Cantwell 
Smith respectively.1 Even to claim that all major religions have faith near 
their core may be to trivialize the distinctiveness of a Buddhist faith and how 
it contrasts with Muslim faith and traditional Christian faith. Thus, Abe is 
amongst those who reject the grounding of all religions in faith as too level­




I believe that Tachikawa Musashi’s recent analysis of Buddhist practice as 
cultivating an experience of a realm of the sacred is cogent.1 2 If Tachikawa 
and others wish to elaborate this point more fully, I believe that they and we 
must distance a Buddhist sense of the sacred from Christian and Muslim 
notions, which include an aspect of fear of the Ultimate. What I think we 
may become able to say is that reverence for that perceived as sacred is a 
107
THE EASTERN BUDDHIST XXXIII, 2
universal aspect of religiosity. Reverence is an attitude of appreciation and 
profound respect. It is my perception that such reverence for the sacred is a 
necessary condition for genuine religiosity and a common ground shared by 
the world’s major religions. Nonetheless, profound ontological, phenomeno­
logical, emotive and aesthetic differences exist between the experience of the 
sacred by persons in differing traditions. An obvious and important example 
is the lack in Buddhist reverence of an aspect of affirming our assertions 
about the sacred as adequate and as being of importance to all humans. Thus, 
I would agree with Abe Masao that there is no common denominator for 
Buddhism and Christianity insofar as it is to be identified at the level of mu­
tually affirmed ontological truth claims.
I am also claiming that my school of Buddhism, Jodo Shinshu
(also known as Shin Buddhism), and most types of Mahayana Buddhism 
include a sense of the presence of the sacred. As a key aspect of religious 
experience in most Buddhist practice, and central to moments of experience 
that are correlated with insight or increased discernment in our tradition, a 
sense of presence is crucial.
This also is a point for comparison and contrast between Buddhism and 
Christianity. The Buddhist sense of presence is always partial and includes 
an aspect of absence. It appears to me that there is no Buddhist ideal of 
absolute presence or thorough transcendence of the absence of the sacred. In 
this regard, Buddhists are not severely challenged by Jacques Derrida’s 
notion that presence must include absence. Rather it is consistent with our 
principles that any person, place or event will be in part present and in part 
absent in a moment of experience. All experience is finite and conditioned 
according to Buddhist principles.
The Buddhist experience of truth is an experience of a partial presence of 
a dependently co-arising whole which must also be partly absent from our 
experience of it. Thus, we find no problematic in Derrida’s statements such 
as, “Nothing ... is anywhere either simply present or absent. There are only, 
everywhere, differences and traces of traces.”31 suspect that most streams of 
Christianity look forward to a realm of full presence that transcends the prob­
lem of absence. Buddhist thinking would notice that longing for the full pres­
ence of that which is sacred is itself a type of thirsting that causes 
unhappiness. On the other hand, it is the Buddhist tradition that extends rev­
erence and discovers sanctity very broadly. Everything should be revered on
3 Derrida 1981, p. 26.
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Buddhist principles. The actual range of persons, places, objects and events 
that can be experienced as sacred expands with Buddhist practice. Jodo 
Shinshu is one of dozens of Buddhist schools that find the utterance of or 
reflection upon Amida Buddha’s name to be the presence of the sacred. 
Amida Buddha is the Buddha of “Immeasurably great Wisdom-light and 
Endless Life.” The combination of Amida’s name with a term meaning “to 
rely upon” in “Namo Amida Butsu,” and its cognates, is the presence of an 
activity of liberating all suffering and deluded beings. Such phrases, when 
spoken or thought, are a presence in finite form of a vast commitment to 
enlighten all beings. This process of recalling Amida Buddha is a way in 
which that which is sacred becomes accessible to us. Although Christian the­
ology seems to look forward to the full presence of the sacred at some point, 
this does not mean the presence of the entirety of reality. Some aspects of 
reality are sacred and some are not proper objects of reverence on Christian 
principles. On Buddhist principles, the unbroken chain of dependent co-orig- 
ination (or suchness, emptiness, the Dharma-realm, etc.) is sacred in all of its 
aspects but present to the conscious experience of any particular subject only 
partially.
In these two regards—reverence for and felt presence of the sacred—Bud­
dhist and Christian traditions can be seen to share much while each remains 
utterly distinctive. These categories may prove fruitful for further inter-reli­
gious dialogue.
I. Believing, Not-Believing and Truth Claims
The centrality of key ontological truth claims in Christian tradition seems to 
demand an affirmation of beliefs as a component in Christian faith. It is 
sometimes hard for our Christian friends to appreciate how detached Bud­
dhist faith is from the commitment to affirm certain beliefs. Buddhist rheto­
ric may occasionally exaggerate the degree to which we avoid metaphysics, 
but a more doggedly experientially-based faith is characteristic of Buddhist 
reverence.
Not-Believing cis Ontology
Most Buddhist concepts are recommended for provisional acceptance— 
“look at it this way if you will.” Such beliefs as a conviction in the reality of 
Amida Buddha’s Pure Land and the trustworthy presence of his liberating 
activity in the saying of his name are recommended for provisional accep­
tance only. We do not insist that our own members affirm beliefs in such 
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ideas as facts and certainly do not feel that all humans need such ideas for 
salvation. All Buddhist schools are, however, founded on the three marks— 
the impermanence of all things, the non-existence of a uniquely self-same 
soul, the efficacy of awakening for the resolution of our suffering. By “no 
soul,” our tradition means to deny the existence of a non-physical, perma­
nent, unchanging, uniquely self-same essence to personal identity. This, it 
seems to me, is an ontological troth claim. Buddhism rejects any sort of soul 
that could be considered a uniquely self-same essence to personal identity. 
This firm refusal to believe in a soul is a metaphysical position, which 
involves an ontological truth claim.
Not-Believing as Religious Experience
In the Jodo Shinshu school of Buddhism the experience of saying Amida 
Buddha’s name as the presence of the sacred contrasts with the unreliability 
of all of our opinions and troth claims. The classical statement of this real­
ization of the unreliability of opinions comes from the record of Shinran’s 
oral teachings:
I know nothing at all of good or evil. For if I could know thor­
oughly, as Amida Tathagata knows, that an act was good, then I 
would know good. If I could know thoroughly, as the Tathagata 
knows, that an act was evil, then I would know evil. But with a 
foolish being full of blind passions, in this fleeting world—this 
burning house—all matters without exception are empty and false, 
totally without troth and sincerity. The nembutsu alone is true and 
real.4
4 Postscript of Tannishd MUBIf (A Record in Lament of Divergences). Hirota et al. 1997, 
vol.l, p. 679. Also in Hirota 1982, p. 44.
There is an intellectual humility here that may be obscured by the apparent 
affirmation of the troth of saying or thinking Amida Buddha’s name (the 
nembutsu). However, even the affirmation of “Namo Amida Butsu” and its 
cognates as “true and real” is not made as an assertion of a truth claim. 
Shinran’s experience of “namanda” and other forms of nembutsu as the 
presence of something sacred is not correlated with affirming his own beliefs 
or even the concepts of the tradition as adequate. The experiential nature of 
this discernment and the absence of asserting troth claims can be seen in the 
following passage from Tannishd'.
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I have no idea whether the nembutsu is truly the seed for my being 
bom in the Pure Land or whether it is the karmic act for which I 
must fall into hell. Should I have been deceived by Master Honen 
and, saying the nembutsu, were to fall into hell, even then I would 
have no regrets.5
5 Ibid., p. 662. Also Hirota 1982, p.23.
6 Hirota 2000b, p. 178.
Shinran’s conviction in the reliability of the nembutsu is not correlated with 
an affirmation of the true existence of Amida Buddha’s land nor the reliabil­
ity of saying the nembutsu for being born there at the moment of death. To 
borrow the language that Tachikawa has adapted from Rudolph Otto and 
Mircea Eliade, Shinran’s experience of the sacred occurs from within a con­
text of thought and belief that are themselves irremediably profane. The 
experience of the sacred and living a life of reverence is perhaps a central 
aspect of Jodo Shinshu with commonalities in Christian tradition and many 
other religious paths. The refusal to take a further step and “affirm proposi­
tions about the world as finally adequate expressions of the truth” is clarified 
in this passage from the work of Dennis Hirota:
First, the realization of truth is inseparable from the realization of 
the final inadequacy of all human conceptuality or constructions of 
reality. This does not mean that one embraces the conviction of 
falsity or relativism as a further proposition within the field of con­
ceptual life, nor is it a merely linguistic solution to metaphysical 
perplexities. It involves an existential reorientation grounded in 
self-awareness of evil. Moreover, the realization of the falsely 
substantializing and ego-centric nature of human conceptuality is 
itself an awakening to or manifestation of truth, and it moves one 
constantly toward “truer,” decentered (and compassionate) per­
spectives and action. Second, the truth that is the opposite face of 
the self-realization of falsity can take on verbal expression, per­
vading the conceptual life of the Shin practicer; this is the role of 
the nembutsu. On the one hand, then, practicers do not transcend 
language and conceptuality (their engagement is not meditation). 
On the other hand, neither do they accept and affirm propositions 
about the world as finally adequate expressions of truth (their en­
gagement is not faith in this sense).6
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This refusal to affirm even one’s most cherished notions as adequate is high­
ly Buddhistic and contrasts sharply with both traditional and fundamentalist 
Christianity.
II. Reverence and Reality
Such reflections as those I have expressed above lead me to the position that 
reverence for that perceived as real and worthy is of the essence of all reli­
giosity. I am sympathetic to the position of Abe Masao, a rejection of any 
unifying principle for all religion, which I mentioned at the beginning of this 
paper. Truly we must honor the vastly different felt qualities of faith and rev­
erence in religions such as Christianity and Buddhism. As a Buddhist, I 
could not accept “God” as a unifying principle. There is nothing in Shin con­
ceptual vocabulary that closely resembles the monotheistic god of the Judeo- 
Christian tradition. For this reason, I find the identification of Amida Buddha 
and Christ in the process Buddhology of John S. Yokota unconvincing.7
7 See especially Yokota 2000, pp. 205-206.
8 See for example Otto 1969, especially pp. 12-19, and Eliade 1959, p. 121.
Reverence is an attitude of profound respect and appreciation felt and 
expressed for that perceived as sacred. Those who find this unifying princi­
ple too leveling or homogenizing may do well to remember that there is 
nothing like the “fear of god” in Buddhism. That Rudolf Otto and Mircea 
Eliade both found such awe near the essence of sacredness is a cautionary 
note.8 Is “sacred” the wrong word for what I am talking about? I don’t real­
ly think so. Others may claim that what I really mean by “reverence” is pre­
cisely the faith that Wilfred Cantwell Smith uses to unify what we usually 
call the world’s major religions. But reverence is a bit different than faith. It 
is both a feeling and a commitment to action. It does not, however, mandate 
unswerving trust. Some Buddhists believe in life after death, some find this 
talk within the tradition as mere metaphor. Some Buddhists consider the pos­
session of Buddha-nature a guarantee of enlightenment one day for all, most 
of us are a bit less optimistic or at least less eschatological in our theorizing.
My own perception of Buddhist tradition is that reverence is first devel­
oped for those persons, places and processes which are seen as sacred. But 
these concrete objects of reverence vary from denomination to denomination 
and even from person to person. We all respect Sakyamuni, the historical 
founder of Buddhist tradition, but he may be revered only with a token nod 
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by some. Amida Buddha is an ultimate object of reverence for all Buddhists 
in the Pure Land stream of tradition, but he is not revered by Theravadins, 
followers of Nichiren’s teachings, nor by Buddhists of some other schools. 
Furthermore, what he/it really is varies on the perception of devotees. Thus 
Amida is, among other things, a person for me, but not so for many. Easily 
half of my Japan-trained colleagues refer in English to the Buddha whom we 
rely upon as “the Amida Buddha.” This grammatically awkward phrase is 
meant to emphasize that Amida is beyond what we normally understand as a 
person.
Reverence may be a necessary condition for religiosity, a necessary com­
ponent to all religions. But the degree to which this is homogenizing might 
be very slight. There is no set of sufficient conditions for being a religion that 
I can outline and reverence itself may not be, in some cases, specifically a 
religious matter. When an atheist-humanist reveres the Bill of Rights, for 
instance, he or she is not turning democracy into a religion. 1 believe that all 
religious persons are reverent toward that perceived as sacred. Yet our con­
cept of what is sacred varies within denominations and within the course of 
individuals’ progress. It is, I believe, typically Buddhist to find the realm of 
the sacred expanding as one is more and more deeply nurtured by tradition. 
For myself, it is the saying and thinking of Amida’s name in some form like 
“Namo Amida Butsu” which is the central object of reverence. Yet even this 
sacramental speech-act, the nembutsu, is not perceived as sacred to the same 
degree at all times. Sometimes my saying of phrases like “Namandabutsu” is 
performed with great reverence. At other times my voicing of Amida 
Buddha’s name is almost mechanical. The sphere of what is sacred for me 
did not include “Namu Myoho Renge Kyo” in 1989 but it has since the mid- 
908. Even so, I did not and do not repeat that phrase in my own Buddhist liv­
ing. The realm of the sacred does not include the Christian Bible for me. For 
me sometimes the sunrise is perceived as sacred and sometimes it is not. 
Handguns are never sacred for me. For a new-age Vedantist, a handgun may 
be a symbol of or even an embodiment of Shiva or perhaps Kali. Am I less 
religious for extending the realm of the sacred less broadly?
A highly regarded Zen teacher once remarked that the rings of Saturn may 
have been caused by a nuclear explosion. Does this mean that catastrophic 
weapons are also sacred? Speaking for myself, catastrophic weaponry is irre­
mediably profane. All Buddhists don’t have to agree about this. Various per­
sons in various streams of the world’s major religions will draw the line 
between the sacred and the profane differently. It is highly Buddhistic to
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aspire for the realm of the sacred to expand and include progressively more 
of that which was formerly considered profane.
Sanctity and Sacramental Acts
The Jodo Shinshu school is one movement within the broad stream of Pure 
Land Buddhism, which centers on the saying of Amida Buddha’s name. 
While the older streams of Mahayana tradition take the nembutsu as a prac­
tice that requires deliberate focus, effort and near constant oral repetition, 
Jodo Shinshu religiosity finds the nembutsu to be the presence of the sacred. 
There is a similarity in the way devotees feel about “Narno Amida Butsu” 
and its cognates and the way Catholic and more traditional Christians feel 
about the receipt of the Eucharist. A Catholic, for example, will consider 
receiving Communion to be an encounter with the sacred. Even so, 
Communion will not be received as often as possible. If someone thinks they 
need to receive Communion at the 6 a.m. mass, the 7 a.m. mass, the 8 a.m. 
mass, and again that night at an evening service, they are almost surely lack­
ing in both faith and religious experience.
The role of the utterance of Amida Buddha’s name in the Pure Land 
stream of Buddhist tradition might be called sacramental in that the utterance 
itself is important as an act providing access to the sacred. Language is not 
here, in its fundamental import, functioning to refer to, or to symbolize 
something outside of the speech-act. The sanctity of uttering phrases like 
“Namo Amida Butsu”/“I rely upon Amida Buddha” derives from the Bud­
dha’s activity in liberating suffering and deluded beings. Amida accomplish­
es this through transferring the practice of reverently saying such phrases to 
them. It is, nonetheless, the finite and somewhat flawed practicers who say 
the nembutsu. Unlike Catholic, Orthodox Christian or esoteric Buddhist 
approaches to ritual, there is no special initiation necessary for one to enact 
the ‘sacrament’ of the nembutsu. Mahayana Buddhist practices are available 
to anyone. The nembutsu is perhaps the most accessible and egalitarian of all 
Buddhist practices.
III. Reverent Practice
To understand the reverent practice of saying Amida’s name as our activity 
empowered by Amida Buddha’s activity is to return to the dynamic religios­
ity evidenced in Shinran’s texts. By placing the emphasis on the experience 
of the sacred along the specific path of saying Amida Buddha’s name, I mean 
to explain how Pure Land Buddhists are given access to this universal reli-
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gious experience. In saying or thinking Amida’s name, we are empowered to 
experience the sacred in reverent practice. The emphasis on the nembutsu as 
the presence of the sacred hopefully provides a link between Pure Land 
Buddhist religiosity and spirituality in the Christian religion. To emphasize 
that reverence is a practice is highly Buddhistic and might provide a resource 
for re-thinking reverence for Buddhists and also for some outside the 
Buddhist tradition.
Dennis Hirotci’s Elaboration of Shinran’s Practice-centered Transcendence 
of Practice
A unique perspective that holds possibilities for spiritual renewal can be 
found in Dennis Hirota’s reintegration of Shinran’s practice-centric ap­
proach to the nembutsu with the transcendence of practice that is so charac­
teristic of Jodo Shinshu religiosity. In the following passage, he contrasts the 
significance of shinjin—in my terms this is a faith which involves a trans­
formative change in identity and which occurs amidst what is usually 
referred to as a religious experience—with the faith expounded by Martin 
Luther, which still involves concerns for justification and righteousness. If 
we are to understand Shinran’s elaboration of shinjin, we must “recognize 
the significance of shinjin in terms of the finality of practice in the immedi­
ate present.”9 This point is made also in the following passage:
9 Hirota 2000a, p. 39.
10 Ibid., p. 38.
[Shinran] states that since shinjin is not simply given by Amida, 
but is itself the Buddha’s mind, the utterance of the nembutsu that 
is the concrete manifestation of this mind in one is perfect practice, 
full of the Buddha’s virtues; hence, with realization of shinjin 
one’s attainment of enlightenment becomes settled immediately.10
The settlement of final liberation in the present moment contrasts clearly 
with the usual Christian perspective on faith, particularly the classic Protes­
tant perspectives such as Luther’s. On that sort of view, it is always possible 
to again become alienated from that which is ultimate and thereby fail to 
enter the realm of the sacred at death. The settlement of the matter of 
salvation by practice, such as Dennis Hirota has elaborated it, contrasts both 
with the usual Christian view of faith and with modem interpreters of 
Shinran and their interpretations of the experience of shinjin. Shinjin and the
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practice of saying the nembutsu have been contrasted in a way which resem­
bles the faith-versus-works rhetoric of normative Protestantism.11 This dual­
istic contrast between a (sacred?) faith-like experience of shinjin and a 
(profane?) activity of saying the nembutsu is inconsistent with Shinran’s 
texts, with his insistence that shinjin and the nembutsu are inseparable, and 
with the actual phenomenology of religious experience in the Pure Land 
stream of Mahayana Buddhist tradition.
11 For a summary of such a dichotomous interpretation of Shinran’s thought and my own 
critique of its splitting the nembutsu off from shinjin, see Gibbs 1997.
Dennis Hirota’s comment that shinjin should be understood in terms of the 
finality of practice in the immediate present might be elaborated as follows:
1) The completion of practice is the attainment of the heart and the 
mind of a Buddha.
2) Shinjin is the heart and mind of Amida Buddha transferred to us 
in the act of reverently saying or thinking his Name.
3) Therefore each moment of faithfully saying his Name, shinjin, is 
a moment which is the finality of practice in the immediate pre­
sent.
A confusion about the saying of the nembutsu has entered Jodo Shinshu tra­
dition due to attachment to the rhetoric of abandoning self-power (Jiriki) and 
relying on the Buddha’s power (tariki, literally “Other Power,” or more 
specifically, “hongan riki,” the power of Amida Buddha’s fundamental 
commitment). The ontological question of where the efficacy of the saying 
of Amida’s name derives from should never have obscured the crucial fact 
that we say phrases such as “Narno Amida Butsu” and our experience of the 
world is significantly changed as a result of this practice. Practice can be 
entirely one’s own, entirely that of another, or a shared reality such as the 
nembutsu. Amida Buddha’s vast compassion empowers the nembutsu but it 
is our sharing in the practice that leads to a transformation in our experience 
of the world. Embraced by the compassion of the Buddha, practicers in the 
Pure Land stream of tradition come, at times, to walk through a realm of 
wonder with hope and some real degree of kindness in their hearts. Entrust­
ing themselves to the salvific power imploded into the nembutsu, they redis­
cover again and again the mystery and reliability of living in the light of the 
nembutsu. 11
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Practice, in Buddhist religiosity, is not necessarily engaging in activities 
that are physically difficult or intellectually demanding. Although practice is 
only final or complete in attaining the heart and mind of an enlightened per­
son, meaningful practice is widespread amongst the billion or so Buddhists 
on this planet. Practice is essentially a matter of seeing things differently and 
behaving a bit better as a result. Whether empowered by Buddhas and 
Bodhisattvas or not, it is a change in perspective. Practice is essentially a 
matter of living a different way, coming to walk through a somewhat differ­
ent world, or perceiving the world you are walking through differently.
The practice of viewing in a renewed way the nembutsu (“true language” 
as Dennis Hirota puts it), our own opinions (false language), and the world 
(simultaneously defiled and pure) is possible through empowerment by 
Amida’s compassionate illumination of our lives. While having no argument 
against Hongwanji-ha traditionalists so far as the ontological source of the 
efficacy of the nembutsu—it is the Buddha’s vast compassion that accounts 
for any change in our viewpoint—some of us feel the need to stress that this 
is a practice. To obscure our participation in walking the nembutsu path with 
jargon about “self-power” is to direct others away from the Buddha’s com­
passion. The very harangue against relying upon our own efforts is the action 
of the ego as it strives to encompass every aspect of our lives within a small 
sub-section of its own domain.
What I am referring to as practice and religious experience are points at 
which inconceivable reality breaks through the hard shell of our ego’s self- 
aggrandizement. Honoring the profound depths that we encounter in saying 
phrases such as “Namu Amida Butsu” is a subtle challenge. We might come 
very close to a correct articulation of Shinran’s guidance and still be re­
enforcing the tyranny of an ego-dominated portion of the verbal and concep­
tual aspects of our identity. Dennis Hirota cautions against wrapping 
Shinran’s vision up into succinct formulas such as to say that the Name of 
Amida Buddha is the form of the formless:
Thus, true language as the Name is characterized by both concep­
tion and inconceivability, form and formlessness. It may be under­
stood in terms of the concepts of Vow and Amida Buddha and, at 
the same time, it is nondual with suchness or formless true reality. 
This does not mean that the Name may be comprehended as 
simply the form of that which is formless, or as a word that refers 
to Buddha or reality. In such an understanding, the Name as word 
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becomes an instrument appropriated within our ordinary modes of 
thought and speech . . ,12
12 Hirota 1993, p. 70.
IV. Brief Ontological Reprise
I have claimed that the role of ontological truth claims is much less central to 
Buddhist tradition than it is to the Christian religion. Even so, we must have 
some notion of what it is that we are reverent toward. Although particular 
schools of Buddhism will emphasize discrete concerns, e.g., Amida and his 
Name for the Pure Land schools, ultimately we hope to become reverent 
toward all things. We are here to some extent affirming a non-dualist ontol­
ogy. When spelled out in philosophical discourse this becomes an assertion 
that each person, place, object and event—just as it is—is an inseparable 
aspect of the dependently co-arising whole. In very positive, perhaps some­
what florid terms, I have described this as the fact that everything is part of a 
“luminous, deathless, utterly free, magically empty non-substantial One­
ness.” Abe Masao, whose thought I referred to at the beginning of this paper, 
would emphasize that this non-dualism is quite different from Monism. I 
agree, but I think the crucial metaphysical point is that Buddhists are not 
dualists. We do not find some aspects of reality to be intrinsically good and 
holy while other aspects are in their essence profane or evil. Neither are we 
pluralists; we do not see reality as a meaningless plurality of persons, places 
and events. Rather than praise our focus on reality as dependently co-arising 
I would prefer to insist that we do not accept a dualistic or a mechanistically 
pluralist view of reality.
My position is that the key stances of Buddhist metaphysics are to be 
found in negative statements. Whether many will accept my “luminous, 
deathless . . description or not, all Buddhists will deny dualism. There is 
no person nor activity that is monochromatically evil from Buddhist per­
spective. However deluded and destructive persons may be and no matter 
how dangerous a process may be, we will not view it as irremediably 
profane. The sacred and the profane are provisionally distinguished for 
Buddhists. On the Jodo Shinshu vision of the world our most sacred object of 
religious concern, the thinking or voicing of Amida’s name in forms such as 
“Namo Amida Butsu,” is working to encompass the whole of reality within 
the realm of the sacred.
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Concluding Remarks
I am accepting our current situation as the last stages of post-modernism. 
Rather than presuming to move onto something new, I am trying to assess 
the position of Jddo Shinshu within this early twenty-first century milieu. 
Shinran’s pre-modemist vision has certain commonalities with post-mod­
ernist thinkers. Standing within the tradition that Shinran established, I feel 
that we can be comfortable with the inclusion of uncertainty and difference. 
These are the veiy qualities which the tyranny of reason has tried to exclude.
On the path of the nembutsu, Shinran has taught us to be comfortable with 
uncertainty (this may be our path to hell, not a heroic career as Buddhas 
through the mediation of Amida’s Pure Land). Buddhist tradition emerged in 
a context of religious plurality and has been propagated in newly encoun­
tered cultures where it does not try to suppress differences, where it has not 
attempted to convert all members of differing religious traditions to its 
vision.
I am reluctant to go so far as Abe Masao in despairing of some unity to the 
world’s hundreds of thousands of religions. I believe that reverence for that 
perceived as sacred is of the essence of religiosity. Discerning persons, 
objects, locations and events to be sacred is a necessary condition for a tra­
dition to be spiritually valid. I have no suggestion as to what a sufficient set 
of conditions for a tradition to be truly religious might be. I find Tachikawa 
Musashi’s application of the time-honored sacred/profane terminology use­
ful in looking at Buddhist practice as sacralization of the space in which one 
is living. Standing within the Jodo Shinshu tradition, I have to grant that the 
process is quite incomplete in my own life and even in the vision of exem­
plars of Pure Land Buddhist spirituality such as Shinran. The Buddhist 
vision of what is sacred is theoretically open to the inclusion of all persons, 
places and events. In practice, living participants in Shinshu tradition contin­
ue to find that some aspects of reality, in particular their own opinions and 
valuations, are quite profane and unreliable. This perspective of both open­
ing the realm of the sacred to include potentially all aspects of reality while 
still finding much in fact to be irremediably profane is quite consistent with 
Shinran’s vision. Even so, it is presented in the thought of Dennis Hirota and 
his long-time colleague the late Professor Ueda Yoshifumi with a clarity 
often missing in elaborations of the Buddha-way by other scholars. In the 
following passage, Hirota and Ueda explain that the opposition between 
samsara—the [profane] round of meaningless birth, death and rebirth—and 
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Nirvana—the [sacred] realm of truth, purity and genuine self-possession—is 
a discrimination that is necessary for the unenlightened however false it may 
be seen to be by Buddhas and world-transcending Bodhisattvas:
In Mahayana thought, one goes out from samsara and attains nir­
vana, but this at the same time means that one breaks through their 
duality. Thus, the bodhisattva path is characterized by two contra­
dictory elements. On the one hand, samsara and nirvana or blind 
passions and enlightened wisdom stand in mutually exclusive 
opposition. As long as one is possessed of blind passions and false 
discrimination, one is not enlightened, and in order to attain en­
lightenment, one must rid oneself of them. Nirvana is attained by 
negating and transcending samsaric existence. On the other hand 
the nirvana thus attained is nondiscriminative wisdom that no 
longer views samsara and nirvana dichotomously. The bodhisattva 
realizes wisdom, and through it returns to life in the world.13
13 Ueda and Hirota 1989, p. 83.
The Buddhist pathways are designed to free us of the false discriminations 
that burden our lives. The fundamental aspect of Buddhist path-traveling is, 
I believe, experiencing reverence for the ever-expanding realm of the sacred. 
The realm of the sacred, for Buddhists, is simply all persons, objects and 
events seen as they are. “Everything is beautiful in its own way” as a pop 
song once claimed. However, this is a tepid conceit for those of us who still 
see the world through the glass darkly of our own prejudicial discriminative 
thought and in the context of our compelling passions.
For those on the path of the nembutsu, saying Amida Buddha’s name in 
forms like “Namo Amida Butsu” is a touchstone that re-aligns us partially, 
but in a genuine way, with the realm of the sacred, with the Dharma-realm. 
We find that there is a long wait between making contact with the sacred and 
actually coming to live consistently with reverence from moment to moment. 
We can only wish those well who have more of a quick-fix approach to reli­
giosity. There are no born-again Buddhists. We were bom once, and 
moments when the sacred is powerfully present are followed by times with 
little felt presence and waning ability to live with reverence. Even so, we do 
hope to live with progressively more reverence as we mature. We are more 
interested in sharing this project of reverent living with realistic Christians, 
fellow Buddhists, and others than dialoging with those who think that blind 
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passions and delusive ways of thinking can be abandoned all at once. We 
look forward to sharing the commitment to reverent living with all those who 
share a conviction in the importance of this way of life.
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